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BUILDING INSTITUTIONS TO ADDRESS MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES:
‘MISSION ACCOMPLISHED’?
Carole McCartney* & Stephanie Roberts**†

ABSTRACT
The revelation of miscarriages of justice can lead a criminal justice
system to a crisis point, which can be capitalized upon to engineer legal
reforms. In England and Wales, these reforms have included the
establishment of three bodies: the Court of Criminal Appeal, the
Criminal Cases Review Commission, and the Forensic Regulator. With
differing remits, these institutions are all intended to address
miscarriages of justice. After outlining the genesis of these bodies, we
question whether these three institutions are achieving their specific
goals. This Article then outlines the benefits accrued from the
establishment of these bodies and the controversies that surround their
operation. At present, both individually and collectively, these
institutions represent a partial solution to miscarriages of justice.
However, this Article argues that calls for a greater focus upon
“actual” innocence made in light of this partial success are misguided.
Such a refocusing may have the unintended consequence of fostering a
climate where miscarriages of justice flourish. The rights of all suspects
need protection, and due process concerns have the concomitant benefit
of protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction. A blinkered
approach to “miscarriages” will not necessarily assist the wrongfully
convicted and may even increase their number.

* School of Law, University of Leeds.
** School of Law, University of Westminster.
† This article is being published as part of a symposium that took place in April 2011 in
Cincinnati, Ohio, hosted by the Ohio Innocence Project, entitled The 2011 Innocence Network
Conference: An International Exploration of Wrongful Conviction. Funding for the symposium was
provided by The Murray and Agnes Seasongood Good Government Foundation. The articles appearing
in this symposium range from formal law review style articles to transcripts of speeches that were given
by the author at the symposium. Therefore, the articles published in this symposium may not comply
with all standards set forth in Texas Law Review and the Bluebook.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of any criminal justice system should be to ensure the guilty
are convicted and the innocent acquitted, and that this is done in a lawful
and just manner. Yet there are a multiplicity of ways in which
miscarriages of justice1 may occur. The criminal justice system in
England and Wales, like many other countries, has endured periodic
crises upon the revelation of wrongful convictions. Such crises have
often resulted in legal reforms. This Article outlines three: (1) the
creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907, (2) the CCRC in
1995, (3) and the Forensic Regulator Unit in 2007. These bodies each
have an explicit remit to prevent or correct miscarriages of justice.
While England and Wales cannot claim, “mission accomplished” with
regard to addressing miscarriages of justice, the creation of these three
institutions, with refinement and proper resourcing, deserves
appreciation. By examining their genesis and remit, judgments regarding
the effectiveness of these institutions can be made, permitting an
appraisal of arguments as to whether there should be a greater emphasis
on innocence within the appellate process.
A glance at the recent history of criminal justice in England and
Wales shows a familiar pattern of crisis and reform. The Court of
Criminal Appeal2 was founded at the start of the twentieth century amid
“heated press opinion, high profile individual cases of miscarriages of
justice, a Royal Commission, and a public inquiry.”3 This series of
events bears a striking similarity to those culminating in the creation of
the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) after a similar crisis in
confidence and a Royal Commission at the end of the twentieth century.
The CCRC was not the only progeny of the 1993 Royal Commission on
Criminal Justice. Although enduring a much longer and more turbulent
gestational period, the office of the Forensic Regulator was also
fashioned as a direct response to the same crisis and high profile
miscarriages of justice, albeit with a remit aimed at prevention rather
than cure.
While the Court of Appeal and CCRC both have enabling legislation
that provides a straightforward encapsulation of their mission and
1. While there remains some residual debate over the nomenclature, this article uses the phrase
“wrongful conviction” to indicate the conviction of the factually innocent, and the phrase “miscarriage
of justice” to encompass a broader category including those who may be factually guilty but were
convicted unlawfully or in contravention of principles of justice. Reforms in England and Wales have
always targeted this broader category which is both necessary and in the interests of justice.
2. The Court of Criminal Appeal became the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in the
Criminal Appeal Act 1966. Therefore, the phrases “Court of Criminal Appeal” and “Court of Appeal”
refer to the same court; the term used is dependent on the time period being referred to.
3. RICHARD NOBLES & DAVID SCHIFF, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 50 (2000).
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operation, the Forensic Regulator has no statutory basis, making
discernment of powers and responsibilities more problematic. However,
all three pose similar problems when it comes to gauging their
effectiveness. While the Court of Appeal and CCRC produce statistics,
which give an indication of throughput, these are woefully inadequate
when measuring their successes in ensuring miscarriages of justice are
corrected. The Forensic Regulator Unit not only has a more oblique
remit with no relevant statistics produced, it has also been operational
for significantly less time, making evaluation more problematic.
However, observations over the intentions of the regulator and the tools
at its disposal can be determined and its effectiveness at preventing
miscarriages of justice postulated. This article will detail the genesis of
each institution, outlining its role and operation before considering some
of the criticisms aimed at each and evaluating its effectiveness in
addressing miscarriages of justice. We start with the oldest institution,
the Court of Criminal Appeal.
II. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
The Court of Criminal Appeal’s creation has been described as “the
product of one of the longest and hardest fought campaigns in the
history of law reform.”4 It took approximately thirty-one Parliamentary
bills5 between 1844 and 1906 before the Court of Criminal Appeal was
created, with judges being the most vocal opponents.6 There are various
reports from the period that reveal that the judiciary did not object to
their decisions being reviewed in relation to sentences or questions of
law, but that they were clearly very hostile to an appeal system based on
errors of fact.7 Official reports generated from various enquiries into
alleged wrongful convictions between 1844 and 1906 show that judges
were reluctant to accept that innocent people were convicted.8 This
attitude of denial contributed to the delay in setting up the court.9
4. JUSTICE COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL APPEALS 6 (1964).
5. This is an approximate figure because different sources suggest different numbers but this is
the figure listed in the Return of Criminal Appeal Bills (1906) H.L. 201.
6. See ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844-1994 (1996) at 22–27.
7. The views of the judges can be ascertained in the following reports: COMMISSIONERS ON
CRIMINAL LAW, SECOND REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1836), CMND 343; COMMISSIONERS ON
CRIMINAL LAW, EIGHTH REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL LAW (1845) PARL. PAP, VOL XIV; HOUSE OF LORDS
SELECT COMMITTEE, REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON AN ACT FOR
THE FURTHER AMENDMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1848) CMND 523;
ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON THE LAW RELATING TO INDICTABLE OFFENCES (1879), CMND 2345.
8. See SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT (1848) Id.: Baron Parke, p.4; Lord Denman CJ, p.44; Lord
Brougham, p.49).
9. This view was also shared by the press. THE TIMES, Feb. 2, 1860 (“We believe that in our
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Prior to the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal, the Home
Secretary10 had the power to grant a pardon to those suspected of being
wrongly convicted under the prerogative of mercy. It was believed that a
Court of Criminal Appeal was then unnecessary as injustice could be
rectified via this procedure.11 The unsatisfactory nature of this process,
however, was illustrated by the cases of Adolf Beck and George
Edalji.12 The Home Office rejected sixteen attempts by Adolf Beck, who
had been mistaken for the real culprit, to have his convictions for
defrauding women in 1896 and 1904 reviewed. Widespread press
coverage led to an inquiry after Beck’s innocence had finally been
confirmed.13 The case of George Edalji added fuel to the flames. Edalji
was wrongly convicted of maiming horses in 1903. He had an alibi and
the crimes had continued while he was in prison awaiting trial. Edalji
was eventually pardoned after a campaign that included a petition of
10,000 signatures being sent to the Home Office and newspaper articles
written by the author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. These cases and others14
showed that whilst the pardon power could remedy injustice, an appeal
process that allowed for errors of fact to be reviewed was also needed.
The Government responded to this mounting pressure by setting up the
Court of Criminal Appeal in the Criminal Appeal Act 1907.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeal was established to remedy
wrongful convictions of the factually innocent, it has often been opined
that it has never fulfilled the function intended for it. Difficulties have
stemmed from its function in deciding appeals on factual error grounds
where the appellant is arguing he or she did not commit the crime,
necessarily forcing the Court of Appeal to trespass on the role of the
jury. The difficulty arises when determining how far it is allowed, or
should be allowed, to do this. The Court of Appeal has been accused of
adopting too restrictive an approach to its role of correcting miscarriages
of justice. Three main complaints have been levelled at the court: that
too much deference has been shown to the jury verdict;15 that there has
Courts of Justice innocent men never are convicted. If at long intervals some singular exception occurs
to this universal rule, it is only an exception, which by its extreme rarity proves the rule.”).
10. The Home Secretary is Secretary of State for the Home Department which is a Government
Department responsible for some areas of the English and Welsh criminal justice system, notably the
police. The other Government Department with responsibility for law and order is the Ministry of
Justice.
11. PATTENDEN, supra note 6, chapter one.
12. For details of Beck and Edalji, see C.H. ROLPH, THE QUEEN’S PARDON 36 (1978);
PATTENDEN, supra note 6, at 27–30.
13. BECK INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE CASE OF ADOLF BECK
(1904) CMND 2315.
14. See PATTENDEN, supra note 6 at 30 n.215 for other examples.
15. See R.E. ROSS, THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (1911); D. Seaborne Davies, The Court of
Criminal Appeal: The First Forty Years, 1 J. SOC’Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 425 (1951); MICHAEL KNIGHT
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been undue reverence to the principle of finality;16 and that the court is
motivated by the fear that “opening the floodgates” to a deluge of
appellants would see the court flounder, ensnared by tight resource and
budgetary constrictions.17 These factors have undoubtedly had an
influence on the Court’s working practices and were fundamental in
establishing the Court as one of review rather than rehearing. This has
led to problems, particularly for those pleading factual innocence.
Leave18 of the Court is generally required to appeal, the test being
whether the appeal is reasonably arguable.19 As Spencer has noted, this
is “a process which lends itself quite well to the detection of procedural
and legal errors, but much less well to dealing with the problem that the
trial court, without breaking any of the rules, just reached the wrong
result.”20 Whilst the appeal judge may be able to determine from the
transcript of the summing up whether the trial judge was biased, or
whether he misdirected the jury on the law, determining whether the
appellant is factually innocent requires more investigation. As the judge
reviews the case on paper and usually does so in his evenings and
weekends, carrying out his normal judicial functions during the day,
there is the potential for many miscarriages of justice to be missed. This
process means that very few appeals get through the leave filter and only
a small fraction of those that do are appeals based on factual innocence.
The Court suffers from a lack of resources, which is why the leave
filter is important as the only control the Court has over the number of
cases appearing before it. Spencer has cited the heavy workload of the
Court as the main reason for its problems in determining factual
innocence appeals. He states:
This institutional overcrowding . . . is the reason, of course, that
defendants who are convicted in the Crown Court need leave in order to
CRIMINAL APPEALS (1970); K. Malleson, Review of the Appeal Process, RCCJ Research Study No. 17
(1993); TUCKER COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON NEW TRIALS IN
CRIMINAL CASES (1954), CMND 9150; JUSTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 4; DONOVAN COMMITTEE,
REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL (1965)
CMND 2755 [hereinafter DONOVAN COMMITTEE REPORT]; RUNCIMAN ROYAL COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CHAPTER TEN (1993) CMND 2263 [hereinafter RCCJ].
16. See K. Malleson, Appeals Against Conviction and the Principle of Finality, J.L.S. 151
(1994); PATTENDEN, supra note 6 73–74; BOB WOFFINDEN, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 322 (1987); P.
Hill, Finding Finality, 146 NEW L.J. 1552 (1996).
17. See RCCJ, supra note 15, at 162–78; J.R. Spencer, Does Our Present Criminal Appeal
System Make Sense? CRIM. L. REV. 677 (2006).
18. A legal term generally translating as “permission.”
19. Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts, chapter 12, ¶ 73 (2001). Available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/ (last accessed
30 November 2012). This process is usually conducted by reading a transcript of the judge’s summing
up, along with Counsel’s advice on appeal, copies of the trial documents, a list of witnesses and the
indictment and record sheet.
20. Spencer, supra note 17 at 684.
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appeal. And it is the reason why the Criminal Division of the Court of
Appeal, like the Court of Criminal Appeal before it, has always done its
best to avoid getting involved in appeals that turn on disputed facts, and
particularly those that require the hearing of witnesses: one of the
consequences of which is that the defendant is in a weak position to
appeal where he was wrongly convicted (as against convicted in
proceedings vitiated by an error of procedure or of substantive law).
Appeals on the basis of “I simply didn’t do it!” are particularly time
consuming, and if the Court of Appeal were obliged to handle anything
but a trivial number of them, this would seriously retard the task of
dealing with appeals against sentence: a task that must be given high
priority, if the court is to hear the appeal before the sentence is served.21

The problem of resources has been a recurring issue and impacts on the
working practices of the Court, as it does on all parts of the criminal
justice system. But it is not just a heavy workload that causes problems;
the Court’s review function also causes difficulties for the factually
innocent. This function was summed up by Blom-Cooper, who stated
that “[t]he Court of Appeal cannot substitute itself for the jury and re-try
the case. That is not its function. It must oversee the fairness of the trial
and satisfy itself that there was evidence on which the jury could
properly convict.”22 If the Court’s role is merely to assess the fairness of
the trial and whether the prosecution had satisfied the burden of proof
and the jury was able to convict, it is very difficult for injustice to be
rectified. It precludes the Court from delving too deeply into factual
issues and the merits of a case. The difficulties the review function has
caused can be illustrated by those appeals that are based on factual error
grounds where, at its most simplistic level, the appellant is arguing he or
she did not commit the crime. These are generally the “lurking doubt”
and fresh evidence grounds of appeal.
The Criminal Appeal Act 1907 gave the Court wide powers to quash
a conviction where the verdict was unreasonable or could not be
supported by the evidence. The approach the Court adopted can be
illustrated by the case of R v McGrath.23 The then Lord Chief Justice,
Lord Goddard summed up the attitude of the Court when he said the
Court was:
[F]requently asked to reverse verdicts in cases in which a jury has
rejected an alibi, but this court cannot interfere in those cases in the
ordinary way, because to do so would be to usurp the function of the jury.
Where there is evidence on which a jury can act and there has been a

21. Id. at 693.
22. LOUIS BLOM-COOPER, THE BIRMINGHAM SIX AND OTHER CASES: VICTIMS OF
CIRCUMSTANCE 8–9 (1st ed. 1997).
23. R v. McGrath, (1949) 2 All ER 495.
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proper direction to the jury this court cannot substitute itself for the jury
and re-try the case. That is not our function.24

This approach was perceived to be a restrictive one and an illustration of
deference to the jury verdict. As a result, the Donovan Committee, set
up to review the Court’s working practices, recommended in 1966 that
“the verdict . . . was unreasonable and contrary to the weight of the
evidence” ground should be replaced by giving the Court the power to
allow an appeal where the verdict is “unsafe or unsatisfactory.”25 The
Committee felt that the advantages to be gained by this change were that
the safeguards for an innocent person wrongfully convicted would be
increased.26 This change was enacted in the Criminal Appeal Act 1966
and consolidated in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.
The aim of Parliament in enacting the unsafe and unsatisfactory
ground was to impose on the Court a duty to form its own opinion about
the correctness of a conviction, notwithstanding the fact that no criticism
could be made of the conduct of the trial. The Court appeared to do this
shortly after the enactment of the 1968 Act in the case of R v Cooper,27
which created the lurking doubt ground of appeal. This requires the
Court to form its own subjective opinion about the evidence in the case.
Lord Widgery stated:
[I]n cases of this kind the Court must ask itself a subjective question,
whether we are content to let the matter stand as it is, or whether there is
not some lurking doubt in our minds which makes us wonder whether an
injustice has been done. This is a reaction which may not be based strictly
on the evidence as such; it is a reaction which can be produced by the
general feel of the case as the Court experiences it.28

Despite the enactment of the unsafe and unsatisfactory ground and Lord
Widgery’s seemingly liberal interpretation of it, the review function
continues to hamper the criminal division’s approach in those appeals
where there is no procedural or legal irregularity and no fresh evidence.
Malleson’s study29 of the first 300 appeals of 1990 revealed that the
principle of lurking doubt was directly or indirectly raised in 10 of the
281 appeals that were finally decided. She concluded that the Court
appears to regard the principle as a last resort for those cases where no
criticism can be made of the trial, yet concern about the justice of the
conviction still lingers.
Malleson’s research was carried out for the Royal Commission on
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 496.
DONOVAN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at ¶ 150.
Id.
R v. Cooper, (1969) 1 Q.B. 267.
Id. at 271.
Malleson, supra note 15.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 13

1340

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

Criminal Justice (RCCJ), which was established on the day the
Birmingham Six were freed30 and it proposed reforms to the appeal
process with the aim of restoring public confidence. The Commission
discussed the lurking doubt ground and stated that they “fully
appreciate[d] the reluctance felt by judges sitting in the Court of Appeal
about quashing a jury’s verdict” as “the jury has seen all the witnesses
and heard their evidence; the Court of Appeal has not.”31 The majority
recommended that there should be a single ground of appeal which was
whether a conviction “is or may be unsafe.” The Government rejected
the words “or may be” preferring the test to be simply “is unsafe” which
was enacted in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995.32 In their response to the
RCCJ, the Government stated that the concept of lurking doubt was
incorporated into the unsafe ground.33 This was confirmed by an update
of Malleson’s research by Roberts using the first 300 appeals of 2002
which revealed that the principle of lurking doubt was referred to
directly or indirectly in seven of the 300 appeals with one allowed and
six dismissed or refused.34 Therefore, although lurking doubt has
arguably been incorporated into “unsafe,” the position under the
Criminal Appeal Act 1995 is not markedly different to that under the
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 with the Court continuing to adopt a
restrictive approach to these appeals despite the recommendations of the
RCCJ.
Although the general consensus has been that the reluctance of the
judges to usurp the role of the jury has inhibited their use of the lurking
doubt ground of appeal, the RCCJ report highlighted the deficiencies of
the Court’s review function. This was illustrated by the late, former
Court of Appeal judge Sir Frederick Lawton, who stated:
The court does not re-try cases . . . . It has to proceed on the basis that
findings of fact implicit in the jury’s verdict are the facts of the case. It
can only disregard them if there is new evidence, or the findings of the
jury were perverse, or the court has a lurking doubt. Reading a transcript
of evidence is not conducive to raising a lurking doubt.35

This explains why very few lurking doubt appeals manage to get

30. This case and the RCCJ report are discussed infra.
31. RCCJ, supra note 15, at 171–72 ¶ 46.
32. This is the current test the Court has to quash convictions. Section 2(1) of the Criminal
Appeal Act 1995 states that the Court of Appeal (a) “shall allow an appeal against conviction if they
think that the conviction is unsafe; and (b) shall dismiss such an appeal in any other case.”
33. LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEP’T, ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FINAL
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (1996).
34. S. Roberts, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice and Factual Innocence: Remedying
Wrongful Convictions in the Court of Appeal, 1 JUST. J. 86 (2004).
35. Frederick Lawton, Judgments Without Prejudice, THE TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990.
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through the leave filter and why they are generally unsuccessful,36 thus
curtailing the opportunities for those who are factually innocent to
overturn their convictions.
Although it may have been the intention of Parliament that the Court
of Criminal Appeal would take an active role in reassessing evidence,
giving the Court wide powers under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal
Act 1907 to adduce fresh evidence, the Court imposed its own
restrictions: the evidence had to be credible and relevant to the issue of
guilt; the evidence had to be admissible; and the evidence could not
have been put before the jury.37 Whilst these criteria were partly due to
deference to the jury verdict and the principle of finality, the third
restriction directly relates to the review function. In 1966, the Donovan
Committee acknowledged that if fresh evidence were admitted, there
would be a risk that the Court would on occasions find itself retrying a
case, which was “a function which Parliament did not intend it to
discharge.”38 The Committee recommended that additional evidence
should be received if it was relevant and credible, and if there was a
reasonable explanation for the failure to place it before the jury.39 These
recommendations were the subject of a late amendment to the Criminal
Appeal Act 1966 which then became Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal
Act 1968. The RCCJ also heard evidence from a variety of witnesses
about problems relating to fresh evidence appeals and made various
recommendations later incorporated into Section 23 of the Criminal
Appeal Act 1968 by Section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995.
The Court now has the power to hear fresh evidence where this is
“necessary or expedient in the interests of justice”40 and must have
regard to four factors: (a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to
be “capable of belief;” (b) “whether . . . the evidence may afford any
ground for allowing the appeal;” (c) whether the evidence would have
been admissible in the lower court on an issue which is the subject of the
appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure
to adduce the evidence in those proceedings.41 There is evidence to
suggest, however, that the Court’s attitude towards fresh evidence
appeals since the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 remains unchanged.42
36. For a further discussion on the problems of lurking doubt appeals specifically, see L. Leigh,
Lurking Doubt and the Safety of Convictions, CRIM. L. REV. 809 (2006) L. James, Criminal Appeals and
the Lurking Doubt 154(49) J.P. 780 (1990).
37. These principles from the early cases are summed up in R v. Parks, (1961) 1 W.L.R. 1484.
38. DONOVAN COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, ¶ 132.
39. Id. ¶ 136.
40. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 23 (U.K.).
41. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 23(2) (U.K.), as amended by Criminal Appeal Act, 1995,
c. 35, § 4 (U.K.).
42. See Roberts, supra note 34.
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Fresh evidence appeals illustrate the complexity of the relationship
between the Court and the jury. The Court defers to the jury verdict
because an appeal is not a rehearing of witnesses (the jury is meant to be
in a better position to draw inferences regarding witness testimony than
the Court of Appeal), and the task of deciding whether a defendant is
factually guilty is legally given to the jury. The review function also
hampers the Court of Appeal from assessing fresh evidence as the Court
is assessing whether the jury could have convicted and not whether it
should have convicted. Yet the Court of Appeal’s deference to the jury
verdict is difficult to comprehend in fresh evidence appeals, because the
Court is deciding on evidence never put before a jury. How should it
then decide on guilt when this is not within its defined role? A lack of
clarity on this issue compounds the difficulties that face the factually
innocent and explains why so few fresh evidence appeals are brought
before the Court and why so few are successful, forcing the innocent to
frame their appeals in technicalities or procedural irregularities.
The resulting emphasis on procedural and technical appeals does
assist those factually innocent appellants who have such irregularities or
“due process” failures in their case. Due process arguments thus have an
important role to play in providing factually innocent appellants with
grounds of appeal. The problem arises when factually innocent
appellants do not have due process failures to argue or when these
arguments are unsuccessful in gaining relief. Such appellants are then
forced to negotiate the flaws of fresh evidence appeals or locate a new
procedural irregularity to try again. This is not an easy task even though
the creation of the CCRC was heralded as the “solution” to such issues.
This body was intended to have the power and resources to undertake
investigations and possibly locate new facts (admissible fresh evidence)
or shed new light on previously argued facts, capabilities that the Court
of Appeal does not have. These capabilities, however, have meant that
the relationship between the Court of Appeal and the CCRC has proved
to be difficult, as those cases sent to the Court of Appeal via the CCRC
can accentuate the very difficulties that the Court of Appeal has in
handling fresh evidence appeals. The CCRC itself has also been subject
of criticism in relation to its ability to deal with factually innocent
appellants, particularly because the origins of the CCRC also lay in
crisis following the revelation of a series of high profile wrongful
convictions.
III. THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION
The origins of the CCRC lay in continued failures of Home
Secretaries to use their powers wisely as well as frustrations with the
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remit and operation of the Court of Appeal. The Home Secretary was
given an additional power by Section 19 of the Criminal Appeal Act
1907 to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal for determination of the
prerogative of mercy. The Criminal Justice Act 1948,43 however,
severed the link between the referral power and the prerogative of
mercy, which left the Home Secretary with the power to grant a pardon
or to refer a case to the Court of Appeal for determination. The Home
Secretary also had the option of commissioning an inquiry into a case,
which was carried out independently from the Court. Section 19 of the
1907 Act became Section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, allowing
the Home Secretary to refer a case to the Court “if he thinks fit.”
The problems associated with this process were highlighted in 1975
when the then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins referred the Lattimore44
case back to the Court of Appeal. This was the first of a number of cases
during the 1970s where the appellants were believed innocent. Three
young boys, Colin Lattimore, Ahmet Salih, and Ronnie Leighton, were
convicted of crimes leading to the death of Maxwell Confait, and after
leave to appeal was refused, a campaign was launched on their behalf.45
Their convictions were subsequently overturned and an inquiry into the
case found serious police malpractice during the investigation.46 The
publicity surrounding this case contributed to calls for a Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP), which made a subsequent
legislative recommendation to codify police powers, leading to the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
During the 1970s there was also hostility to references by the Home
Secretary to the Court of Appeal, illustrated by the notorious case of
Cooper and McMahon.47 Cooper, McMahon, and another man Murphy
were convicted of murder. The case went to appeal in February 1971
and was dismissed. The case was referred back to the Court, and in
November 1973 Murphy’s conviction was quashed. Home Secretary
Roy Jenkins then referred the case of Cooper and McMahon back to the
Court in 1974, and the case was rejected. After public disquiet and
media concern escalated, the case was referred back to the Court again
in 1976, and failed, while a fifth referral to the Court was rejected by
Lord Widgery. A month after publication of a book on the case by
Ludovic Kennedy, the Home Secretary William Whitelaw remitted

43.
44.
45.
46.

Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 49, § 38(6) (U.K.).
R v. Lattimore, (1976) 62 Cr. App. R. 53 (U.K.).
See CHRISTOPHER PRICE & JONATHAN CAPLAN, THE CONFAIT CONFESSIONS (1977).
HENRY FISHER, REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE HONOURABLE SIR HENRY FISHER INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE TRIAL OF THREE PERSONS ON CHARGES ARISING OUT OF THE DEATH
OF MAXWELL CONFAIT AND THE FIRE AT 27 DOGGETT ROAD, LONDON SE6 (1977).
47. WOFFINDEN, supra note 16.
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Cooper and McMahon’s sentences, and they were released from prison.
However, the case was referred back to the Court of Appeal for the sixth
time in 2003; the convictions were finally quashed, but by then both had
died.48
The cases of Laszlo Virag and Luke Dougherty also raised concerns.
In 1974, a free pardon had been given to Virag, and Dougherty’s
conviction had been quashed by the Court of Appeal. The Home
Secretary announced in the House of Commons that, in view of the
serious questions raised by these two cases, he had appointed a
committee, headed by Lord Devlin, to look into the law and Home
Office procedures. The report, published in 1976,49 was highly critical of
the Home Office’s practices in the Virag case, which had meant a twoyear delay in his release because of the “serious misjudgment of the
importance of the case by the officer who first dealt with it, coupled
with the fact that officers in the Division were under exceptional
pressures due to staff shortages.”50
There continued to be disquiet about Home Office procedures into the
1980s. A series of television programmes about wrongful convictions
were broadcast on the BBC in April 1982, featuring individuals who had
petitioned the Home Office for referral to the Court of Appeal. These
BBC programmes, entitled Rough Justice, provoked a great deal of
interest, including from the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee.51 The Committee heard oral evidence concerning these
cases and others from Home Office officials, representatives of the
human rights organisation JUSTICE, and the Criminal Bar Association
(CBA). The Home Affairs Committee subsequently reported that both
JUSTICE and the CBA had suggested that the chances of a successful
petition to the Home Secretary might sometimes depend less on the
intrinsic merits of the case than on the amount of external support and
publicity it was able to attract. The report referred to Lord Devlin’s
proposal in 1976 for an independent review tribunal, stating that the
proposal had been rejected by the Home Office on the grounds that the
existence of a body would have detracted from the Home Secretary’s
freedom to reach decisions and that it would in practice operate as
“another court above the Court of Appeal.”52
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeal continued to be hostile to Home

48. R v. Cooper [2003] EWCA Crim 2257.
49. DEVLIN COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE OF
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1976) HC 338.
50. Id. ¶ 6.17
51. HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SIXTH REPORT, MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE, (1981-82) HC 421.
52. Id. ¶ 12.
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Secretary references, and calls persisted for an independent review
tribunal. On June 16, 1988, a motion was debated in the House of
Commons to establish an independent review body, but it lost by 121
votes to 45.53 The real catalyst for change proved to be the cases of the
Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six.
The “Guildford Four,” wrongly believed to be members of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA), had been convicted of the murders of five
people in 1975 who died in the Guildford and Woolwich pub bombings.
Their first appeal just two years later was heard after convicted IRA
terrorists confessed to carrying out the pub bombings. This appeal
failed. The case garnered a great deal of public interest, featuring in a
number of books and television programmes, and the Home Secretary
referred their case back to the Court of Appeal in 1989 after a persuasive
campaign by a number of Members of Parliament, House of Lords
peers, and two former Law Lords, Devlin and Scarman. New evidence
showed confession evidence had been fabricated, and the Director of
Public Prosecutions stated that the Crown no longer wished to maintain
the convictions.54 The Court of Appeal consequently quashed the
convictions. The “Birmingham Six” were also believed to be part of the
IRA and were similarly convicted of murder in 1975, this time for the
Birmingham pub bombings. They had two failed appeals in 1976 and
1988, and as a result of public pressure surrounding this and the
Guildford Four case, the Home Secretary referred the case to appeal in
1991. The Director of Public Prosecutions again stated that the Crown
no longer wished to maintain the convictions, but the Court of Appeal
heard the appeal in full. After hearing evidence that confessions had
been tampered with and that there were serious flaws in the forensic
evidence, the Court quashed the convictions.55
A number of other “Irish terrorism” convictions were overturned at
this time, including those of the “Maguire Seven.” The Home Secretary
referred this case to appeal in 1990, and the convictions were overturned
largely on the basis of nondisclosure of evidence and the discrediting of
forensic evidence. They had all served their sentences by this time and
one of them, Giuseppe Conlon, father of Gerard Conlon, who himself
was one of the Guildford Four, had died.56 The conviction of Judith
53. B. Woffinden, The Independent Review Tribunal, NEW L.J. 1108–09 (1989).
54. See WOFFINDEN, supra note 16; GERRY CONLON, PROVED INNOCENT: THE STORY OF GERRY
CONLON OF THE GUILDFORD FOUR (1990); PAUL HILL & RONAN BENNETT, STOLEN YEARS: BEFORE
AND AFTER GUILDFORD (1990); Clive Walker, Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice, in
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR 31 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds.,
1999); NOBLES & SCHIFF, supra note 3.; PATTENDEN, supra note 6.
55. See BLOM-COOPER, supra note 22; WOFFINDEN, supra note 16; CHRIS MULLIN, ERROR OF
JUDGMENT: THE BIRMINGHAM BOMBINGS (1986).
56. See ANNIE MAGUIRE & JIM GALLAGHER, WHY ME? (1994).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 13

1346

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80

Ward, who had been tried in 1974 for the twelve deaths resulting from
the bombing of a British Army coach, was also overturned in 1992 after
forensic evidence was discredited and a large amount of material never
disclosed to the defence was discovered. Her confessions were also
deemed unreliable due to mental incapacity.57
The case of the Guildford Four led to an inquiry by Lord Justice
May.58 Such an inquiry was time-consuming (taking four and a half
years), expensive, and of course hugely embarrassing to the government
and law enforcement authorities. The government clearly did not desire
a thorough inquiry, then, into each further miscarriage of justice as they
came to light, so the Birmingham Six and Judith Ward cases were never
examined in any depth. Although a Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice (RCCJ), chaired by Lord Runciman, was announced as a direct
response, the Commission did not confine itself to the issues set out in
the terms of reference and instead took an expansive view of their remit,
extending almost to the entire criminal process.59 As previously
discussed, the RCCJ reporting in 1993, recommended changing the
Court of Appeal’s powers to quash convictions and amending the fresh
evidence provisions in Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The
major change however, was the recommendation that a new body should
be created to consider alleged miscarriages of justice, to supervise their
investigation if further inquiries are needed, and to refer cases to the
Court of Appeal. The CCRC was subsequently created in the Criminal
Appeal Act 1995 and began work on April 1, 1997.
The principal reason for establishing a new body was the need for
decisions to be made independently of the executive. To ensure this, the
Criminal Appeal Act provides that the CCRC “shall not be regarded as
the servant or agent of the Crown.”60 However, the Commission’s
connection with the Government is not completely severed, as the
Commissioners are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of
the Prime Minister.61 One-third of the Commissioners must be legally
qualified62 and at least two thirds of the members of the Commission
“shall be persons who appear to the Prime Minister to have knowledge
or experience of any aspect of the criminal justice system.”63 The
Commission is also reliant upon the Ministry of Justice for resources
57. See JUDITH WARD, AMBUSHED (1993).
58. SIR JOHN MAY, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
CONVICTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE BOMB ATTACKS IN GUILDFORD AND WOOLWICH IN 1974 (1990)
H.C. 556.
59. RCCJ, supra note 15, at 162–78.
60. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8(2) (U.K.).
61. Id. § 8(4) (U.K.).
62. Id. § 8(5) (U.K.).
63. Id. § 8(6) (U.K.).
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and the Ministry sets the terms and conditions of the Commission
members’ employment.
Under the Criminal Appeal Act, the Commission has the power to
require an “appropriate person” from the public body that carried out the
original investigation to appoint an investigating officer to carry out
inquiries.64 Where the public body was a police force, the appropriate
person will be the Chief Constable of that force.65 This has proved
controversial. Malet has argued that the Act takes a very trusting attitude
towards the police by leaving the police to examine their own failings.66
A related problem is that the police must finance the cost of the
reinvestigation. The majority of investigations and case reviews are
undertaken by CCRC Case Review Managers, who write a report and
make a recommendation that is sent to Commissioners to review. If the
case is to be rejected (i.e., not sent for a further appeal), then a
Commissioner alone can review the report and decide. A panel of three
Commissioners is required to decide that the case should be referred
back to the Court of Appeal.
Eligibility for review depends on whether the application arises from
a conviction in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Only in
exceptional circumstances can a case be referred without the applicant
having exhausted the normal appeals process. To refer a case to the
Court of Appeal, the Commission is given statutory guidance under
Section 13, which states that there must be a “real possibility” arising
from an argument or evidence that was not raised during the trial or at
appeal, or from “exceptional circumstances,”67 that the conviction or
sentence would not be upheld.68 The exceptional circumstances, a late
insertion after a lengthy campaign, remain defined on a case-by-case
basis. These statutory provisions appear more restrictive than the power
the Home Secretary had to refer cases “if he thinks fit.” It is difficult to
define what real possibility means but the late Supreme Court judge,
Lord Bingham, stated that a real possibility “plainly denotes a
contingency which, in the Commission’s judgment, is more than an
outside chance or a bare possibility, but which may be less than a
probability or a likelihood or a racing certainty.”69
While the CCRC is widely accepted to be an improvement on the
64. Id. § 19(1) (U.K.).
65. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 22(4) (U.K.).
66. D. Malet, The New Regime for the Correction of Miscarriages of Justice, Part 2 159(44) J.P.
735 (1995) at 736.
67. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35 (U.K.).
68. Id. at 13(1)(a), (b) (U.K.); Criminal Appeal Act 1995, 1995, c. 35, § 13(2), (U.K.)
(explaining that the Commission may require the Chief Constable to appoint the investigating officer
from his own force or another.).
69. R v. CCRC Ex Parte Pearson, (2000) 1 Cr. App. R. 141, 149.
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Home Secretary’s reference procedure, there are major difficulties in
assessing its performance. The Commission receives 800 to 1000
applications annually and refers around 4 percent of completed cases to
appeal. It is argued that a 4 percent referral rate is too low, but it remains
problematic to state that more cases should be referred without
examining them in more detail; it is also difficult to provide anything
more than anecdotal evidence, emanating from those who have been
rejected, that more cases should be referred back to appeal. It is clear
that the Commission is referring far more cases than the Home Office,
which referred 67 cases between 1980 and 1993,70 but this is to be
expected given the increased budget and manpower. If the
Commission’s referral rate were not significantly better than the Home
Office, then serious questions would have to be asked about its
competence. In crude statistical terms, Nobles and Schiff calculated that
in 2006–2007, the Commission made a contribution of 0.058 percent to
the total successful appeals against conviction and sentence.71 If using
these figures to measure the Commission’s contribution to remedying
wrongful convictions and sentences, the contribution appears
insignificant.
The Commission’s “success” rate at the Court of Appeal has also
been the subject of controversy. As of May 2013, there were 528 CCRC
referrals to the Court of Appeal, and 498 had been heard. Of those, 341
had been quashed and 145 had been upheld.72 This represents a success
rate of 60.8 percent of those appeals heard by the Court (341/528).
When calculated in terms of cases that have been closed (15,199), the
Commission has won a further appeal in just over 2 percent of eligible
cases. The difficulty for the Commission is if the success rate at appeal
is too high, it appears that the Commission has set a prohibitive
threshold for referral by sending only those certain to win. However, if
the successful appeal rate is too low, then it appears that the
Commission is sending weak cases with little chance of success,
irritating the Court of Appeal. This balancing act was outlined in a
memorandum to the House of Commons Justice Committee:
The Commission has accordingly had to tread a careful line between not,
automatically, referring all but the most threadbare cases (so as not to
70. PATTENDEN, supra note 6.
71. Richard Nobles & David Schiff, After Ten Years: An Investment in Justice? in THE
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT 151, 152–53 (Michael Naughton ed.,
2010). This figure is based on 33 referrals which succeeded at the Court of Appeal out of 2000
successful appeals against conviction and sentence. The 0.058 per cent figure is the total successful
Commission referrals (33) out of 57,000 people found guilty and sentenced in the Crown Court.
72. See the CRIM. CASES REV. COMM’N Case Library which is available on the Ministry of
Justice website at http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/criminal-cases-review-commission/case-library (last
accessed 27 June 2013).
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burden the courts with a mass of hopeless appeals) and not being so
cautious as to refer only those cases where it judges the applicants
prospect of success on appeal is more or less assured.73

There are other areas where the Commission has been criticised and
these criticisms can be divided into two broad areas. The first is its
working practices and backlog of cases; the second is its lack of focus
on those who are factually innocent.
Since the Commission’s inception, it has been besieged by problems
of funding, delays, and backlogs.74 Initially, the Commission was a
victim of its own success as large numbers applied; additionally, 279
cases were transferred from the Home Office, which were prioritised by
the Commission. The First Report of the Home Affairs Select
Committee in 1998–1999, which scrutinised the work of the
Commission, reported that there was a two-year delay before cases were
reviewed.75 As a result of this backlog, the Commission was given an
enlarged budget of £1.28 million to increase the number of Case Review
Managers from twenty-eight to forty during 1999–2000 and to fifty
during 2000–2001. The move proved to have an impact on cases
awaiting review, which dropped from 1,208 in May 1999 to 211 by
March 31, 2004.76 However, the Commission’s funding was reduced
from £7.8 million in 2004 to £5.75 million in 2005, which coincided
with the largest increase in applications for five years. This prompted
the then Chairman Professor Graham Zellick to report in the 2005–2006
Annual Report that due to budget restraints, backlogs and waiting times
had increased.77
73. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, MEMORANDUM, 2009, H.C. 343 (U.K.), available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/343/9031004.htm
(last
accessed 28 November 2012).
74. See A. James, N. Taylor & and C. Walker, The Criminal Cases Review Commission:
Economy, Effectiveness and Justice, CRIM. L. REV. 140 (2000); R. Nobles & D. Schiff, The Criminal
Cases Review Commission: Reporting Success, 64 MOD. L. REV. 280 (2001); Clive Walker & Carole
McCartney, Criminal Justice and Miscarriages of Justice in England and Wales, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 183 (C. Ronald Huff &
Martin Killias eds., 2008).
75. HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT: THE WORK OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMMISSION, 1998-9, H.C. 106 (U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmhaff/106/10602.htm (last accessed 27 November 2012). The
CCRC was originally under the remit of the Home Office and therefore subject to the scrutiny of the
Home Affairs Select Committee. It is now under the remit of the Ministry of Justice and so under the
scrutiny of the House of Commons Justice Committee.
76. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS, 2003–2004, H.C. 9
(U.K.). Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110215111039/http://www.ccrc.
gov.uk/CCRC_Uploads/2003%20-%202004_AnnualReport.pdf (last accessed 1 December 2012).
77. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS, 2005-2006, H.C. 1290
(U.K.).
Available
at:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110215111039/http://www.
ccrc.gov.uk/CCRC_Uploads/Annual%20Report%202005%20-%202006.pdf (last accessed 1 December
2012).
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In a bid to streamline, the Commission changed its working practices
in 2006, which are set out in its annual report. These changes appear to
be having a positive impact on the Commission’s backlog despite
further reductions in funding. In giving evidence to the House of
Commons Justice Committee on March 10, 2009, the current Chairman,
Richard Foster, stated that there were seventy-eight cases waiting to be
allocated to a case review manager (down from 225 in March 2006) and
that complex cases now had a twenty-week wait (down from twenty-one
months in 2005). He stated that quicker allocation of cases had reduced
the backlog and that approximately eighty-five percent of cases were
resolved within twelve months.78 However, the reduction in funding has
also led to a reduction in Case Review Managers of thirty percent over
the period 2005–2011, a cut necessary to prevent a projected funding
gap of £1.8 million by 2010–2011. The reductions have also forced the
Commission to cut the number of Commissioners from sixteen to
eleven. Unless funding increases (which is highly unlikely), the
Commission runs the risk of struggling to keep waiting times and
backlogs in check, with cases potentially cursorily reviewed and
possibly rejected too swiftly.
The Commission has further been criticised for its lack of focus on
factual innocence. These criticisms largely relate to its role which is to
‘review the cases of those that feel they have been wrongly convicted of
criminal offences, or unfairly sentenced. We consider whether there is
new evidence or argument that may cast doubt on the safety of an
original decision.’79
This perceived lack of focus on innocence was explained by former
Chairman Professor Graham Zellick who stated that:
[T]o deal only with people who are innocent—even if they could be
identified—would not . . . widen our role, but would greatly narrow
it . . . . What of the principle of legality, of due process and of the
integrity of the criminal justice process? We think these things are rather
important, as does the Court of Appeal.80

The Court of Appeal has the
considers the conviction to be
interpretations of unsafe: that a
wrongly convicted, or a factually

power to overturn convictions if it
“unsafe.” There are currently two
factually innocent person has been
guilty person has been convicted but

78. Examination of Witnesses, JUSTICE COMMITTEE, Q6 & Q7, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/343/9031001.htm (last accessed 1
December 2012).
79. See CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N: OUR ROLE (OVERVIEW), http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110215111039/http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about/about_27.htm (last accessed 2
December 2012).
80. Graham Zellick, Letter to the Editor, THE GUARDIAN, June 20, 2005.
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there has been a serious procedural or legal error or illegality.81 The
Court’s approach is summed up in R v Hickey and others, where Roch
LJ stated:
This court is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the appellants;
but only with the safety of their convictions . . . . [T]he integrity of the
criminal process is the most important consideration for courts which
have to hear appeals against conviction. Both the innocent and the guilty
are entitled to fair trials.82

The Commission can refer a case where there is a real possibility that it
will not be upheld, which means it refers cases under both
interpretations of unsafe. Its work is thus not restricted to just those who
maintain innocence and as a result, the Commission’s approach has been
criticised:
The CCRC’s dependence on the criteria of the appeal courts has the
knock-on effect that its reviews are merely safety checks on the
lawfulness or otherwise of criminal convictions, as opposed to the kind of
in-depth inquisitorial investigations . . . that seek the truth of the claims of
innocence by alleged victims of miscarriages of justice in the way that
was expected by the RCCJ.83

As a result of this perceived reluctance of the CCRC to involve itself in
“innocence” claims, Naughton states that there is then a need for a body
that, “unlike the CCRC, is not bound to the criteria of the appeal courts
and is sufficiently resourced and empowered so that it is not dependent
on government,”84 although he does not explain how such a body would
be funded or operate. In defence of the CCRC’s position, David Jessel, a
former CCRC Commissioner, has responded that:
[F]ewer innocent people would be freed if the legal criterion was
provable innocence rather than unsafety of conviction, if only because it
is so damnably difficult to prove. Is this what the campaigners want? If
so, be careful what you wish for . . . . [T]o consider the safety of a
conviction provides a sterner test for the system and a more useful one for
the innocent individual than any test for factual innocence alone ever
could.85

81. For a discussion on the two interpretations of unsafe, see S. Roberts, ‘Unsafe’ Convictions:
Defining and Compensating Miscarriages of Justice, 66 MOD. L. REV. 441 (2003).
82. Court of Appeal, unreported, transcript 30 July 2007.
83. Michael Naughton, Conclusion, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION: HOPE FOR
THE INNOCENT? 233 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010).
84. Id. at 225.
85. David Jessel, Innocence or Safety: Why the Wrongly Convicted are Better Served by Safety,
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/dec/15/prisons-andprobation (last accessed 2 December 2012); See Hannah Quirk, Identifying Miscarriages of Justice: Why
Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer, 70 MOD. L. REV. 759 (2007).
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There are a number of points to be made in relation to this. The Court of
Appeal has always proven more receptive to appeals based on
procedural or legal errors (“due process” failures) than those based on
factual innocence as previously discussed. Therefore, if the Commission
believes there is a greater chance of success with a procedural or
technical ground of appeal, then it is going to increase its chances of
success when referring on that basis. This benefits those who are
factually innocent, those who are most often seriously hampered by the
“invisibility” of their innocence: “[I]nnocence is not something that
exists, out there, to be touched, felt, or measured, any more than guilt.”86
To demand proof of factual innocence as a threshold for appellants
would raise the bar to a prohibitive level and would inhibit further the
CCRC—particularly at their initial stage of review. This is where
procedural and legal issues are critical, as these are often visible on the
face of documents and materials initially reviewed, rather than buried
deep in a case, requiring significant investigation to uncover.
Downgrading the importance of due process arguments would be
unworkable in practice, and it should be the role of an appellate court to
uphold the integrity of the trial process and protect the right to a fair
trial, which is conducted according to law, regardless of guilt or
innocence.
Applications relying on a claim of factual innocence often do not
have a legal or procedural error, or if they did, those arguments would
have been made at the first appeal. The difficulty then arises in locating
fresh evidence. Whilst the CCRC can be criticised for taking too
restrictive an approach when deciding that evidence would not pass the
fresh evidence provisions in Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act
1968,87 many of the CCRC’s problems are in fact created by the
approach of the Court of Appeal. This is, of course, exacerbated by the
subservient position of the Commission in relation to the Court of
Appeal. If the Court takes a restrictive approach to fresh evidence, then
it is understandable to some extent that the Commission will also. A
simple solution is to abolish the fresh evidence restrictions in Section 23
of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, which would give the Commission
more flexibility. This would also allow compelling evidence of factual
innocence that was available at the trial and the first appeal to be
referred back to the Court.
Whilst the Commission can perhaps be criticised for being too

86. R. Nobles & D. Schiff, Guilt and Innocence in the Criminal Justice System: A Comment on
R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 69 MOD. L. REV. 80, 91 (2006).
87. See Campbell Malone, Only the Freshest Will Do, in THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMM’N: HOPE FOR THE INNOCENT? 107, 109 (Michael Naughton ed., 2010).
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cautious in its relationship to the Court of Appeal,88 there is little point
in having a body such as the CCRC referring cases without regard to the
powers and procedures of the Court of Appeal. Therefore, it is perhaps
better to look to reforming the Court of Appeal to make that institution
more receptive to factual innocence claims. An alternative solution, as
Naughton suggests, would be to make more use of the pardon power,
which the Minister of Justice may still exercise when convinced of a
person’s innocence.89 A pardon removes the punishment for the crime,
which is obviously beneficial to those imprisoned; however, there is the
potential for creation of a “two-tier” appellate system, with a Court of
Appeal rectifying procedural and legal errors and the Minister of Justice
dealing with cases of factual innocence. This takes us full circle to the
constitutional problems that led to the removal of the Home Secretary’s
referral power and the creation of the CCRC. The pardon power also
does not remove the conviction, which only the Court of Appeal has the
power to do. This is illustrated by the notorious case of Derek Bentley
who was executed for murder in 1953. After a prolonged campaign by
his sister, he was eventually pardoned in 1993, but his case had to return
to the Court of Appeal in 1998 before the conviction was finally
overturned.90 Therefore, making more use of the pardon power is not
necessarily a solution to these problems.
The CCRC was not the only progeny of the 1993 Royal Commission
on Criminal Justice. While the creation of the CCRC could be
considered a relatively swift and necessary reaction to the failings of the
appellate process, there was also consideration of the causes of the
miscarriages of justice that had necessitated the Royal Commission. The
so-called Irish terrorism wrongful convictions had brought to the fore
the issue of expert evidence and flawed forensic science. Many of the
cases had been characterised by an early reliance upon false test results
stating that the individuals had been in contact with explosives. The
RCCJ looked then at the issue of forensic science and the use of experts
during the criminal process and found that there were no real checks and
balances in place to prevent reliance upon flawed forensic science or
charlatans. This prompted recommendations that were preventative in
nature, although these reforms were to take considerably longer to be
acted upon.

88. See R. Nobles & D. Schiff, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Establishing a
Workable Relationship with the Court of Appeal, CRIM. L. REV. 173 (2005); Walker and McCartney,
supra note 74.
89. The Home Secretary previously had the power to grant a pardon but the power now rests
with the Minister of Justice.
90. R v. Bentley (deceased), [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 21.
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IV. THE FORENSIC REGULATOR UNIT
There is an obvious risk of wrongful convictions with reliance upon
unsupervised or unregulated scientists, or upon unscientific techniques.
During an investigation a “false positive” can inculpate an innocent
individual, while a “false negative” may mean a perpetrator will go
undetected and can continue offending. Poor scientific and professional
standards thus destabilises public confidence in forensic science and
consequently has an impact upon confidence in the criminal process.
During the massive expansion of forensic science provision in England
and Wales in the last fifty years, there have been a series of reports
commenting upon the provision, as well as the regulation, of forensic
services.
Given that many of the major miscarriages of justice of the 1980s and
1990s had at their core flawed forensic evidence, the RCCJ looked into
the provision of expert and scientific evidence, making thirteen
recommendations specific to forensic science. Of these, the
establishment of an oversight body was deemed a priority. The Report
recommended the creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council
(FSAC) to serve as the regulator for the forensic science community.
Such a Council could be a mechanism for ensuring scientific standards,
integrity, and continuity of provision of forensic science to the criminal
justice system. A report into serious contamination at a military forensic
explosives laboratory by Professor Caddy in 199691 also recommended
the creation of an “Inspectorate of Forensic Sciences” and advocated the
registration of individuals as forensic practitioners. Reforms were not
initiated, however, until the 1999 establishment of the Council for the
Registration (CRFP).
The CRFP was established to give the courts a single point of
reference on the competence of forensic practitioners. It was to promote
public confidence in forensic practice in the United Kingdom through
publishing a register of competent forensic practitioners; ensuring that
registered practitioners stayed up to date and maintained competence;
and disciplining registered practitioners who did not meet the required
standards of “safe, competent practice.”92 The CFRP register was
welcomed as an important step in ensuring that those presenting
themselves at court as expert witnesses were competent to fulfil that
91. BRIAN CADDY, ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRIFUGE CONTAMINATION IN THE
TRACE EXPLOSIVES SECTION OF THE FORENSIC EXPLOSIVES LABORATORY AT FORT HALSTEAD (1996).
92. Applicants were required to provide details of their qualifications and experience, references
from colleagues and users of their services, and declarations about their past and future conduct. An
assessor from the relevant specialty reviewed a sample of their recent cases against competence criteria
developed in association with professional bodies. Registration was granted for four years, submitting
annual returns.
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role. However, it stopped far short of bringing rigorous scrutiny to bear
upon forensic science, and problems with flawed forensic and expert
evidence continued. For example, in February 2007, Gene Morrison was
jailed for appearing in numerous court cases as a forensic psychologist.
Working on over 700 cases from 1977, he was found guilty of
perverting the course of justice and perjury. He had earned over a
quarter of a million pounds for reports that were often cut-and-pasted
from the internet. His “qualifications” had been purchased from sham
universities over the internet.93 In the light of financial difficulties, lack
of stakeholder support, and the failure to prevent such problematic
“experts,” the CRFP was closed in 2009.
The failures of forensic science were still causing considerable
concern throughout the short lifespan of the CRFP, whose remit was too
restricted to have much impact upon forensic science failures. In 2002,
four youths had been put on trial for the murder of a schoolboy named
Damilola Taylor. All four were acquitted, leading to a reexamination of
the police investigation and forensic exhibits, during which significant
blood spots and fibres were found that had been overlooked during
initial examination. A major inquiry ensued, concluding that “human
failures” had led to the omission of vital bloodstains.94 A House of
Commons Science and Technology Select Committee 2005 report,
Forensic Science on Trial, made sixty recommendations on the
regulation of forensic science, the training of scientists, and other
pertinent issues, calling for the Government to establish a “Forensic
Science Advisory Council” to oversee and regulate the forensic science
market and provide independent and impartial advice on forensic
science. After consultation, the government decided that a named
individual would become a “Forensic Regulator,” emulating other
regulatory structures, with the responsibility of overseeing the quality of
forensic science in England and Wales.
The first Forensic Regulator was appointed in 2007 and was tasked
with establishing and monitoring quality standards, including those
applying to national forensic science intelligence databases, and
ensuring the accreditation of suppliers of forensic services. The
Regulator’s Manual95 sets out requirements for all forensic science
service providers, and the Regulator oversees accreditation (via the UK
93. Fraudulent
forensic
expert
jailed,
BBC
NEWS
(Feb.
17,
2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/manchester/6386069.stm. In 2009, he was also found guilty
on several charges relating to the rape and sexual assault of at least six young girls. Bogus Forensic
Scientist Jailed for Child Rape, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/england/manchester/8407395.stm.
94. Alan Rawley and Brian Caddy, DAMILOLA TAYLOR: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE (2007).
95. Still in draft form and requiring detailed appendices.
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Accreditation Service (UKAS)) using the international laboratory testing
ISO17025 standard for all laboratories that supply forensic services.
While reliance upon ISO17025 has been widely seen as appropriate, the
standard is not specific to a forensic laboratory, necessitating
supplementary standards and modifications to tailor the standard to
forensic science.96
On the one hand, the introduction of a Regulator was presented as
creating an oversight body for forensic science providers in the UK
based on ISO standards and “a light touch” in steering forensic service
providers. However, with a lack of “teeth” and with gaps in regulation,
accreditation may prove to be superficial, although the lack of a
statutory basis and enforcement powers have not yet been deemed a
hindrance requiring remedial legislation. Even with UKAS appending
supplementary standards onto ISO17025 to make it forensic specific, it
is unlikely that any standard can regulate every aspect of a forensic
practitioner’s work. Oversight of crime scene examination and evidence
retrieval remains very difficult, if not impossible, particularly where
police personnel are working without external supervision. Over half of
forensic science services (measured by cash value) in England and
Wales are delivered within police forces’ own scientific support
services, with this set to increase. These services are not yet subject to
the same quality standards regimes as apply to commercial providers.
Yet different standards increase the risk of flawed results being relied
upon or challenged in the courts.
At present few of the scientific processes delivered by police
scientific support services are subject to accredited quality standards, yet
the closure of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in the UK and the
budgetary crisis in the public sector are seeing police personnel
increasingly carrying out forensic processes. A parliamentary report into
the closure of the FSS in March 2012 has warned that the government
did not sufficiently consider the wider implications for the criminal
justice system of such a closure, and remarks upon the “in-house”
provision of forensic services by the police directly:
It is an issue of great concern that many police laboratories are not
accredited to the same quality standards as the FSS and private sector
providers . . . . We are of the view that the transfer of work from the FSS
to a non-accredited police or private laboratory would be highly
undesirable, as it would pose significant and unacceptable risks to
criminal justice. The role of the Forensic Science Regulator is vital and
we urge the Government to bring forward proposals to provide him with

96. The Forensic Regulation Unit, Manual of Regulation, December 2008, 9.16 (p38).
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statutory powers to enforce compliance with quality standards.97

The use of personnel directly employed by the police or working
alongside police in shared premises, for example, has been denounced
by all reports looking into forensic science. Indeed, high-profile
miscarriages of justice in England and Wales were tainted by the
suspicion that the police had too easily influenced scientists who were
undertaking testing and reporting results. The UK Forensic Regulator’s
Codes of Practice for individual forensic practitioners states that all
practitioners be governed by the principles of “independence,
impartiality and integrity,” but as Glidewell LJ stated in the Judith Ward
appeal:
For lawyers and judges a forensic scientist conjures up the image of a
man in a white coat working in a laboratory, approaching his task with
cold neutrality, dedicated only to the pursuit of scientific truth. It is a
sombre thought that the reality is sometimes different . . . . Forensic
scientists employed by the government may come to see their function as
helping the police. They may lose their objectivity.98

The Forensic Regulator insists that “organisational structures” do not
hinder the goals of independence, impartiality, and integrity, but this is
optimistic perhaps, if a scientist is employed by, or working directly
alongside, the police. While one would wish to believe in the integrity of
all law enforcement and forensic science personnel wherever they may
be situated, only naivety would lead one to rely upon it.
Thus, there is still a heavy reliance upon the integrity of the
individual, and keen and capable supervision of their work. Yet even
forensic scientists concede that forensic science “is not sufficiently well
developed as a profession to have the full characteristics of a profession
in place.”99 The expansion of the private forensic science market has
also raised the possibility of increasing the number of “cowboys” or
“charlatans”: (dishonest, or incompetent practitioners) and “cherry
pickers” (companies or scientists who will undertake only ‘profitable’
forensic services and eschew the longer, more complex and costly
forensic investigations). Practitioners may face pressures that are
supposedly balanced by professionalism of the scientist, but they may
feel under duress from customers who demand “useful” results;
otherwise, materials can be sent to other providers, or payment for tests
that produce “no results” can be withheld. Along with most of the public
sector in the UK, the Regulator also faces serious resource restrictions.
97. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE, 2010-12, H.C.
855, at 3 (U.K.).
98. LJ Glidewell in R v. Ward [1993] 1 W.L.R. 619 at 674.
99. S. Willis, Forensic Science, Ethics and Criminal Justice, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC
SCIENCES 523 (J.G. Fraser and Robin Williams eds., 2009).
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Failings in the provision of expert evidence have taken place against a
backdrop in the UK of the privatisation of forensic science provision,
leading to even greater need for robust regulation. There is a clear need
in a deregulated market for forensic science to avoid “bargain basement”
forensic services that cut corners. While economic dire straits may make
savings on scientific support attractive, the consequences of “cut-price”
forensic services or experts should be obvious. Indeed, the UK is
already witnessing the return of “in-sourcing” of police scientific
support services. It does not require much trawling of the historical
record to recount that the influence of police over “experts” was often at
the root of flawed expertise in high-profile miscarriages of justice. With
the police in charge of forensic evidence during an investigation, there is
a need for accountability, with transparency paramount.
V. CONCLUSION
That wrongful convictions can have an enduring impact upon the
criminal justice system is not a revelation. As this article has shown, the
wrongful convictions of the factually innocent have played a significant
part in achieving large-scale law reform in England and Wales. But both
the CCRC and the Court of Appeal suffer from similar criticisms;
despite owing their creation to the wrongly convicted factually innocent,
both have proved to be deficient at identifying and correcting factual
innocence claims.
For the Court of Appeal, this deficiency is evidenced by the
difficulties faced by those arguing fresh evidence or lurking doubt
appeals. The Court’s approach to these appeals is not surprising given its
lack of resources, its willingness to uphold jury verdicts in order to
retain confidence in them, and the restrictions placed upon it by its
review function. Consequently, its preference for due process appeals is
easy to understand given that the task of assessing whether due process
has been followed is much easier compared to trying to assess whether a
person is factually innocent. Appellants, guilty or innocent, are then
often forced to frame their appeals in technicalities. While assisting
those who have due process failures, this lack of focus on innocence
means that for those who do not have due process failures, fresh
evidence and lurking doubt appeals will remain rare and difficult. An
appeal process that allows the appeal court to assess whether the jury
should have convicted rather than whether it could have convicted may
provide an answer to these problems.
These problems associated with the Court also impact on the CCRC.
While it is accepted that the CCRC is an improvement on the previous
government machinery for referring cases back to appeal, criticisms
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remain that it too has proven deficient in a number of areas. Its funding
and the number of applicants have caused significant difficulties. Yet
whilst there are criticisms in terms of its referral rates, and its success at
the Court of Appeal, evidence of these problems remains anecdotal and
there is no reliable method by which to gauge whether more cases
should have been referred back to the appeal courts. If it is true that the
Commission has prioritised procedural and technical grounds of appeal
over those of factual innocence (and there is no empirical evidence to
support this) then it is somewhat understandable that the Commission in
its subservient role will sensibly refer those cases that are more likely to
be successful. This is not necessarily the Commission’s fault, and we
would argue that critics should be recalibrating their aim and seeking to
reform the Court’s illiberal approach to fresh evidence (and therefore
factual innocence) appeals.
A further valid criticism of it though is in respect of mission failure.
The CCRC has not taken up (some may argue, due to lack of resources)
the systemic role that was envisaged by the RCCJ. The Royal
Commission did not inquire into the specific causes of individual cases
of wrongful conviction, even though it was established in light of
several high profile appeals. Instead, it took a much broader view and
interpreted the Terms of Reference as seeking reforms that could
prevent future miscarriages of justice.100 The CCRC was given a similar
role—to use its knowledge, gained via case-work, to recommend
systemic reforms that could prevent future miscarriages.101 However, it
can be argued that the CCRC has yet to fulfil this part of its remit. It has
become too “bogged down” by individual casework, and while it has
contributed to criminal justice policy, it could do much more than it
currently does in this respect. The CCRC then is undoubtedly an
improvement on the Home Office in seeking to address miscarriages of
justice in the Court of Appeal, but there does not appear to be any
quantifiable evidence that it has achieved anything by way of
prevention. If the CCRC is unwilling or unable to accept this wider
remit, then this “slack” should be picked up by another body. This
potentially explains the rise in Innocence Projects in England and
Wales, which provide a platform in which innocence arguments can be
heard and calls for reform made.102
100. Of course, many have argued that the RCCJ failed in this mission itself.
101. It was stated in the RCCJ report, supra note 15 chapter ten ¶ 22, that ‘we think it is important
that the [Commission] should also be able to draw attention in its [annual report] to general features of
the criminal justice system which it had found unsatisfactory in the course of its work, and to make any
recommendations for change it thinks fit.’
102. For a discussion on the relationship between Innocence Projects and the CCRC in England
and Wales, see S. Roberts and L. Weathered, The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence
Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29(1) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2009).
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The legal engineering then undertaken in England and Wales in
creating the Court of Appeal and the Criminal Cases Review
Commission has resulted in two bodies that seek to overturn
miscarriages of justice, albeit with only partial success, with both in
need of reform and extra resourcing if they are going to succeed and
take a preventative role, too. The only significant body that has a wholly
preventative remit (which has no real role—as yet—in overturning
miscarriages of justice) is the Forensic Regulator. However, the
preventative role of the Regulator is seriously limited by underresourcing and a lack of powers. It may also yet lead to a false sense of
security with legal professionals relying upon the validity and veracity
of scientific evidence that in effect is still poorly regulated.
The forensic market in England and Wales remains in turmoil, with
serious limitations to any guarantees that forensic evidence will not play
a role in any future miscarriages of justice. Placing the Regulator on a
statutory footing may assist, but unless the Regulator is given a
considerably widened remit and strong powers in conjunction with legal
reforms that limit the admission of flawed scientific evidence into the
courts, then this body will fail to have a critical impact upon
miscarriages of justice.
The Forensic Regulator holds only a detached position with respect to
the criminal process. However, the Regulator was appointed in light of
miscarriages of justice as a preventative measure, yet it has resulted in
only a partial attempt to guarantee no further convictions will be marred
by flawed science. Many other developments in the forensic science
market are presently working against this aim and could be increasing
the risk of miscarriages of justice. The result could be that the Court of
Appeal and CCRC are going to be put under greater strain in the future
because the body trying to prevent miscarriages of justice is hamstrung
by a lack of powers and limited remit, and developments in the criminal
justice process in the previous decade have seen due process protections
diminished and risks of flawed evidence increased.
England and Wales has then turned to incremental reforms to try and
maintain, or strengthen due process protections. Yet the “law and order”
rhetoric has most often triumphed, resulting in the diminishment of due
process protections. This contrasts with the U.S., where work on
exonerations has expanded to include policy formation and lobbying,
which has led to significant policy and legislative changes across many
states to protect the innocent from conviction. In England and Wales the
route taken concentrates upon due process instead of “innocence.” This
in itself is not to be criticised, because the pursuit of justice is assisted
by such due process protections and encompasses justice for the guilty
at the same time as protecting the innocent. Due process is important for
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maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system and securing
public confidence. It does, however, entail difficulties for those innocent
individuals who may fall through the many cracks, as the system still
functions poorly to assist them postconviction. While there could be
modifications to current bodies and processes to make them more
conducive to recognising and swiftly addressing miscarriages of justice,
we suggest the bodies remain focussed on due process because of the
extra benefits offered by this approach. The rights of the guilty matter,
too, and due process protections also protect the innocent. There must
not be a blinkered focus on the innocent; it is far better to concentrate
efforts on seeing that all individuals are being convicted lawfully: “This
razor focus on the wrongful convictions of people who had nothing to
do with the crime dilutes the spectrum of other reasons why people are
wrongly convicted.”103
It appears in this instance, that the phrase “mission accomplished” can
be attributed the same meaning as that surely intended by President
George W. Bush on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft
carrier during the Iraq War. England and Wales have made significant
advances and have made commendable progress in addressing
miscarriages of justice. However, there is still much to achieve, and it
may take years and further turmoil before the institutions are optimised
and their operations refined. Until such time, perseverance with reform
efforts and vigilance remain essential to ensure that miscarriages of
justice do not continue to blight the criminal justice system.

103. E. Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2011).
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